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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PETER M. COATS, 
Petitioner, PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
vs. 
KATHRYN TUCK COATS, No-
Court of Appeals 
Respondent. No. 920588 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court of Appeals depart from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings when it found the trial court's 
finding of fact was clearly erroneous but affirmed the judgment on 
grounds that were not preserved at trial nor raised on appeal? 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was rendered on December 
22, 1994 in an unpublished opinion which is contained in the 
Appendix to this Petition. 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on December 
22, 1994. An extension of time to file this Petition was granted 
by Justice Leonard Russon on January 23, 1995 and extended the 
time for filing until February 2, 1995. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the granting or denying of this Petition for 
Certiorari pursuant to Section 78-2-2(5), U.C.A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The sole purpose of this litigation was to divide and 
distribute property acquired during the marriage of the parties. 
A Decree of Divorce had previously been entered. Several issues 
were raised by the Defendant in the Court of Appeals as to his 
claim that the lower court had improperly distributed the assets 
of the parties because of improper calculations and use of 
erroneous evidence. The plaintiff filed a cross appeal asserting 
numerous claims of error on the part of the trial court as to both 
the distribution of property, visitation, and support of the 
parties ' children. 
Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
The litigation in the lower court was extensive and required 
approximatey five days of trial during the summer of 1992. Judge 
Wilkinson was required to rule on many issues concerning the 
custody and visitation of children, alimony, distribution of 
assets, and requests for contempt of court. The complexity of 
this divorce action is best illustrated by the over thirty pages 
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were required to 
be entered. 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Defendant contended 
that the lower court had erred as to four specific distributions 
of property. On cross appeal, Plaintiff raised ten claimed errors 
as to the lower court's decision. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals essentially ruled in 
favor of the defendant as to two of the four issues and in favor 
-2-
of Plaintiff as to one of her claimed errors. 
The sole basis for this Petition of Certiorari concerns 
Defendant's second contention of error raised before the Court of 
Appeals concerning a debt incurred by the defendant to his mother. 
In order to fully understand the decision of the Court of Appeals 
and the reasons for requesting certiorari, it is necessary to 
briefly review the facts surrounding this claimed error. 
Defendant is a successful real estate broker and developer. 
During the course of their marriage, it was necessary for 
Defendant to borrow money from his mother Isabell Coats in order 
to finance a real estate development project. Defendant 
maintained that he had borrowed approximatey $400,000 from his 
mother and that this was therefore a legitimate debt that had to 
be considered before dividing the property with the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, initially took the position 
that there was no legitimate debt owed by Defendant and that the 
entire transaction was manufactured after the divorce proceedings 
began. For example, during the cross examination of Isabell Coats 
by Plaintiff's attorney, assertions were made repeatedly that the 
promissory note executed by the defendant to his mother was not 
legitimate and was manufactured prior to the commencement of the 
trial. (Tr. 988-90). The note, Exhibit 50, was dated January 
26, 1990 and provided that a maximum of $400,000 could be drawn by 
the defendant after the note's execution. Isabell Coats 
emphatically stated that the promissory note was a bona fide loan 
upon which she expected payment. She maintained that she obtained 
money for the loan by borrowing on her own Kidder-Peabody margin 
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account. (Tr. 980-87). 
Throughout the first few days of trial, Plaintiff refused to 
recognize any debt owing to Isabell Coats. See, for example, 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 8, 13, and 31. On the other hand, even 
Plaintiff's accountant acknowledged that he was aware of 
Defendant's $400,000 claim concerning the note to Isabell Coats 
and acknowledged that if there was such a valid note, then 
Defendant should be given a liability deduction on his side of the 
accounting. (Tr. 624). In addition, Plaintiff's witness, David 
Evans, testified that he had also learned of the lien of Isabell 
Coats for $400,000 and that in fact, a title search on a property 
owned by Mr. Coats revealed a $400,000 trust deed note. (Tr. 
1084; Ex. 57). Defendant's balance sheets prepared prior to his 
mother's testimony, consistently recognized a debt of $401,000 
together with accrued interest of $10,025. (Defendant's Ex. 58 
and 59). 
The crux of the appeal and this Petition for Certiorari 
concerns the testimony of Isabell Coats herself. On direct 
examinaton, Isabell Coats testified as to the existence of the 
agreement between herself and her son. Exhibit 50 contained the 
note as well as various letters and other documents attached to 
the note showing that draws had been made against it. The total 
of these documents amounted to $270,000. Isabell Coats never 
testified as to the exact amount that was drawn upon the $400,000 
note. The following testimony given by Mrs. Coats on direct 
examination illustrates the ambiguity in her testimony: 
A. However it was an open-ended note. 
-4-
Q. You did not disburse money out at all with that? 
A. The money was disbursed in increments from my Kidder 
margin account as necessary for things in the 
development, 
Q. Now, the need for the note are copies of several 
letters, can you tell us what those are? 
A. This is what I was talking about, 
Q. Are these letters copies of letters that were written by 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they are written to Fred A, Moreton at Kidder-
Peabody? 
A. Yes. He's my brother. 
Q. You typically deal through him in relation to your 
accounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were these written at or about the time that you got— 
the dates on these letters? 
A. These letters are dated, as far as I know, exactly. I 
would sometimes telephone, and then he would do it and I 
followed up with the letters; but usually it was written 
in anticipation. 
Q. But these represent draws against that note, 
$400,000? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. 981-82). (Emphasis added). 
There is nothing in Isabell Coats1 testimony which states or 
inferes that Exhibit 50 and the accompanying documents constituted 
the entire amount of the draws. 
Apparently, after listening to the testimony of Isabell 
Coats, Plaintiff and her attorney decided to abandon the claim 
that no valid debt existed and instead began to assert in various 
exhibits that the actual debt owing was only $270,000—the total 
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of the written authorizations attached to the promissory note 
contained in Exhibit 50. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 65, 90, 91, 97 
and 98. 
Isabell Coats was called at the beginning of the trial 
because she lived in California and was unavailable for the rest 
of the trial. After Plaintiff changed her position of no debt to 
a limited debt, Defendant offered three forms of evidence to 
support the entire $400,000 contention. First, Defendant himself 
testified to the existence of a valid loan agreement as contained 
in Exhibit 50. As to the exact amount, however, he stated he did 
not know and that he relied entirely upon his own accountants who 
maintained his records for that information. (Tr. 1056-57). 
Second, Defendant called Melody J. Rasmussen, a CPA assisting 
Defendant in his case, who testified as to the loan between 
Defendant and his mother. Plaintiff's attorney objected to this 
testimony on the grounds that such testimony would contradict the 
direct testimony of Mrs. Coats as to the amount of the loan and 
also directly contradict Exhibit 50 containing the note and 
various letters written concerning the note. (Tr. 1376-77). The 
Court overruled the objection. (Id.). 
Third, through the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen, Exhibit 72 was 
admitted into evidence. This Exhibit contained numerous letters 
and accountings from Mrs. Coats together with an accounting of the 
various draws made by the defendant. In addition, copies of 
checks which Defendant claimed to be interest payments on the 
loans were contained in this Exhibit. Ms. Rasmussen testified 
that as of April 30, 1992 there was $401,000 owing on the note and 
-6-
$10,025 of accrued interest owing. (Tr. 1379). 
In closing argument, Plaintiff's attorney contended that the 
testimony of Ms. Rasmussen and the accompanying exhibits were in 
contradiction to the direct testimony of Isabell Coats who he 
claimed stated that the entire amount of the loan was $270,000 as 
represented by Exhibit 50. Plaintifffs attorney stated in 
closing argument: 
...That Mrs. Coats testified to these letters and 
"all the evidence of all the loans I made" and the very 
first loan she said she made was a March, 1990 loan and 
that's when they began." 
And then we go through there and those add up, Your 
Honor, to $270,000. And the note doesn't say $400,000, 
it says up to $400,000. (Tr. 1244-46). 
Judge Wilkinson accepted the position argued by Plaintiff and 
concluded that Mrs. Coats had in fact testified that the documents 
attached to Exhibit 50 constituted the entire debt and that the 
testimony of the accountant and her exhibits were in direct 
contradiction. The Court entered Finding No. 14(k)(2) which 
states the following: 
The Court finds the liability owed to Isabell Coats 
to be $270,000. There was conflicting evidence 
presented to the Court as to the amount of liability 
owed to Isabell Coats. Isabell Coats testified to the 
Court and stated that Defendant's Exhibit D-50 showed 
all of the obligations owed by the defendant to her. 
The total amount of the notes which make up Defendant's 
Exhibit D-50 is $270,000. While the defendant's 
certified public accountant testified on the amount of 
the notes and stated that the outstanding balance was 
$411,025, that amount was never verified by Isabell 
Coats, and the Court cannot reconcile in its mind the 
difference between the amount testified to by the 
certified public accountant and the amount testified to 
by Defendant's mother who is the creditor of the note. 
The Court finds that the most credible evidence is 
that of the creditor and that if she were owed more than 
$270,000 that testimony certainly would have been 
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presented to the Court. That is especially true in the 
mind of the Court when the defendant placed Isabell 
Coats on the stand out of time to be able to get her 
testimony in regarding the liability and amount owed to 
her by the defendant. Accordingly, the Court 
specifically finds that the preponderance of the 
evidence is that the outstanding note owed to Isabell 
Coats is the amount of $270,000. (Findings of Fact, pp. 
17-18). (Emphasis added). 
It is apparent that the lower court rejected Defendant's 
claim of $411,000 on the assumption that the testimony of Isabell 
Coats directly contradicted the testimony of the accountant. As 
noted earlier, however, a review of the transcript of Isabell 
Coats' testimony shows no such contradiction. Isabell Coats never 
stated the amount that was owing to her and never stated that all 
of the letters attached to the promissory note contained in 
Exhibit 50, were the entire sum due and owing to her by her son. 
It is clear from reading the entire transcript that Isabell Coats 
did not state any figure whatsoever as to the amount owing. 
Thus, since Isabell Coats did not state any amount that had 
been drawn on the note, the only relevant evidence before the 
trial court was the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen and the 
accompanying exhibit showing Defendant's version of the amount 
that had been borrowed from his mother. Defendant, as the debtor, 
was certainly entitled to present his evidence as to what he 
claimed was owing to his mother. 
Defendant's evidence was consistent that a note was executed 
by Defendant to his mother for up to $400,000, that various draws 
were made by his mother from her Kidder-Peabody account throughout 
the two-year period in order to finance Defendant's building 
projects. The interest payments made by the defendant as 
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evidenced by checks in the record, were completely consistent with 
the amounts claimed to be owing both by the accountant and by the 
documents contained in Exhibit 72. 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Defendant claimed 
that the lower court had erred in concluding that the total debt 
owing was $270,000 and in not recognizing the legitimate amount of 
over $400,000, (Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 19-26; 
Defendant's Reply Brief, pp. 9-13). Defendant cited the Court of 
Appeals to a line of cases which hold that the testimony of a 
witness who does not remember whether a certain event took place 
does not contradict the positive testimony of another witness that 
such event or conversation in fact did take place. McClellan v. 
David, 439 P.2d 673 (Nev. 1968); see also, Comment, Note-
Comparative Value of Positive and Negative Testimony, 98 A.L.R. 
161. (Defendant's Reply Brief, p. 12). 
In the Court of Appeals, Plaintiff argued that the lower 
court was correct in concluding the $270,000 amount since the 
lower court had wide discretion in judging the credibility of the 
witnesses. Plaintiff quoted extensively from the transcript 
concerning the cross examination of Isabell Coats but was unable 
to cite any specific reference to the amount owing. 
Thus, the position of the two parties before the Court of 
Appeals was well drawn. Defendant contended that the factual 
finding was not based upon the evidence and was therefore clearly 
erroneous. He maintained that his mother had never stated the 
amount owing on the note and therefore there was no contradiction 
of testimony in the positive testimony that he offered. 
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Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintained that Isabell Coats had 
specifically stated an amount of $270,000 owing and that any 
testimony by Defendant's accountants would be in direct 
contradiction of that testimony and therefore should be left to 
the judge to decide the credibility. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals found in favor of the 
defendant as to his claim that his mother had not testified as to 
any specific amount of the debt. Even so, however, the court 
sustained the judgment on the basis that the testimony of Ms. 
Rasmussen and the accompanying documents did not have an adequate 
foundation and was based upon second-hand information of which Ms. 
Rasmussen could not establish its reliability. The relevant 
decision of the Court of Appeals as to this issue is as follows: 
Mr. Coats also asserts that the trial court wrongly 
determined that a debt owed to his mother had a balance 
of $270,000 in principal, rather than approximately 
$400,000, as claimed by him. The evidence of this issue 
is problematic. Mr. Coats1 mother testified about a 
note payable to her and her husband, signed by Mr. 
Coats, for a principal sum of up to $400,000. She 
further testified that advances on the notes were 
arranged by either a letter or a telephone call followed 
by a letter, to her brother, who worked at Kidder-
Peabody. The advances were facilitiated by loans 
against Mrs. Coats1 own account at Kidder-Peabody. The 
letters which Mrs. Coats actually verified during her 
testimony referred to various advances totaling 
$270,000. She did not, however, testify that these 
letters either did or did not represent all advances 
under the note to Mr. Coats. Subsequently, Mr. Coats 
called a CPA, Melody Rasmussen, who testified over Mrs. 
Coats1 objections, to amounts Mr. Coats owed his mother. 
Ms. Rasmussen referred to Defendant's Exhibit 72, which 
included her handwritten computations of the debt and 
copies of letters purportedly signed by Mrs. Coats and 
copies of checks, purportedly for interest payments on 
the note. Ms. Rasmussenfs testimony, however, was based 
on what she was told by another accountant and the 
content of the letters. She could not verify that 
advances had actually been made, nor their amounts. 
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As a result of the nature of this evidence, the 
trial court had to sort out the testimony of Mr. and 
Mrs. Coats, which verified that the loan did exist, and 
that of Ms. Rasmussen, which lacked an adequate 
foundation for the actual figures. Contrary to the 
assertions of Ms. Coats, it appears that the trial court 
accorded considerable credibility to Mrs. Coats, by 
finding that the debt existed and also including in the 
balance due all the testimony presented by Mrs. Coats, 
which was limited to $270,000. The trial court 
discounted the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen because it was 
based solely on second-hand information—she could not 
establish its reliability. The trial court has 
considerable discretion in assessing conflicting 
evidence and may give weight to the testimony as it 
deems appropriate. Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 
410 (Utah App. 1989). In this instance, we find no 
abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining 
that the principal balance on this debt was $270,000. 
(Slip Opinion, pp. 2-3). 
Thus, the Court of Appeals essentially ruled that the lower 
court had erred in concluding that "Isabell Coats testified to the 
Court and stated that Defendant's Exhibit D-50 showed all of the 
obligation owed by the defendant to her." [Finding No. 14(k)(2)]. 
The Court of Appeals specifically held that "she did not, however, 
testify that these letters either did or did not represent all 
advances under the note to Mr. Coats." Instead of vacating the 
Finding and ordering reversal or remand, however, the Court of 
Appeals basically ruled that the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen lacked 
legal foundation and was therefore incompetent to consider on its 
own merit. This ruling was made even though (1) Plaintiff had 
never objected to the testimony of Ms. Rasmussen on the basis of 
lack of foundation or reliability, and (2) Plaintiff never cross 
appealed or raised this issue during any of the appellate 
proceedings. 
Defendant, therefore, is seeking review of the Court of 
Appeals' decision to correct this erroneous application of 
-11-
appellate principles which have been discarded by the Court of 
Appeals. 
REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
The decision by the panel of the Court of Appeals has clearly 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings and has distorted the requirements of appellate review 
by concluding that the Findings of the lower court were erroneous 
but nevertheless affirming the decision based on grounds not 
properly preserved in the trial or appeal. 
A review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals 
clearly shows that the appellate panel accepted the argument by 
Defendant that his mother's testimony did not specifically contain 
any amount that was owing to her by the defendant. Because the 
lower court erroneously assumed (without the benefit of a 
transcript) that Isabell Coats1 testimony directly contradicted 
the testimony of the accountant and other documents, the Court 
based its entire award on this alleged contradiction. A review of 
the transcript by the Court of Appeals, however, showed that this 
assumption was wrong and that "she did not, however, testify that 
these letters either did or did not represent all advances under 
the note to Mr. Coats." (Slip Opinion, p. 3). 
It is fundamental that a trial court's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Dole v. Bradley, 784 
P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). Moreover, findings are clearly 
erroneous if an appellate court reaches the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. Sorensen v. Kennecott 
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Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994). 
1. The Court of Appeals Should Have Reversed 
the Judgment or, at a Minimum, Remanded for 
Further Proceedings. 
When a critical finding of fact is deemed to be clearly 
erroneous the accepted and usual course of appellate judicial 
proceeding is to reverse the judgment based upon such finding or 
remand to the lower court for the correction of such finding. As 
to the first alternative of reversal, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma noted that when a district court as part of its judgment 
makes separate findings of fact which are found insufficient to 
support judgment, the decision is contrary to law and must be 
reversed. Cook v. Oklahoma Board of Public Affairs, 736 P.2d 
140 (Okla. 1987). Moreover, where the conclusions reached by the 
trial court are against the clear weight of the evidence, an 
appellate court has the right and duty to set aside the judgment 
of the trial court and render the judgment which should have been 
rendered originally. Taton v. McCalsin, 417 P.2d 316 (Okla. 
1966). 
The very panel which rendered this decision recognized this 
overriding appellate principle in the first portion of its 
decision. It found that the lower court had erred in concluding 
that promissory notes written from a Kidder-Peabody account after 
the divorce was final could not be deemed marital property and 
therefore reversed and vacated the award made by the lower court 
on this erroneous assumption. In other cases, the Court of 
Appeals has also vacated judgments that were based upon erroneous 
factual findings. Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P.2d 
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243 (Utah App. 1993) . 
A second alternative remedy that the Court of Appeals could 
have adopted was to remand the issue of the Isabell Coats note 
back to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court 
could then examine all the evidence presented at trial after the 
erroneous assumption had been eliminated from the decision making 
process. The Court could then make new findings based upon the 
credible evidence to determine whether the full amount of the debt 
as claimed by the defendant should be recognized. 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did remand to the 
lower court the question of whether a $4,300 credit had been 
properly given to the defendant. It certainly could also have 
remanded the issue of over $140,000 at the same time. When 
findings are deficient because they fail to evaluate critical 
factors, it is appropriate to remand for further proceedings. 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to either vacate the 
judgment in its entirety or in failing to remand for further 
proceedings. 
2. The Court of Appeals Departed from Accepted 
and Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings by Basing 
Its Decision on Factors That Were Not Properly 
Preserved Below or Raised on Appeal. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment even though it 
found that Isabell Coats had not contradicted the testimony of the 
accountant. The Court of Appeals concluded that the accountant's 
testimony "lacked an adequate foundation for the actual figures." 
It further concluded that the accountant's testimony was based 
solely on second-hand information and therefore was not reliable. 
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It is fundamental that it is not the function of an appellate 
court to make findings of fact because it does not have the 
advantage of seeing and hearing a witness testify. Rucker v. 
Dalton, 598 P. 2d 1336 (Utah 1979). Thus, the Court of Appeals 
has no authority of its own to make its own determination as to 
the credibility of the various pieces of evidence offered in this 
matter. 
The two bases used by the Court of Appeals to categorically 
reject the affirmative evidence of the debt presented by the 
accountant of Mr. Coats was that such testimony did not have 
sufficient foundation nor was it reliable. Neither of these 
grounds, however, was raised in the court below. 
The only objection made by Plaintiff's counsel concerning Ms. 
Rasmussen's testimony concerned the same argument made on appeal: 
namely, that her testimony could not be used to contradict the 
definite testimony of the creditor and therefore was not the best 
evidence of the debt. Plaintiff's counsel objected to Ms. 
Rasmussen's testimony as follows: 
MR. PETERSON: I would object and move the testimony be 
stricken, and object to this witness' testifying in any 
regard as to amounts currently due and owing. 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 50 has been admitted before this 
Court by the creditor Isabell Coats, and the defendant's 
Exhibit No. 50 speaks precisely to amounts owed, and 
this witness has been called. It appears to me, to 
contradict the defendant's Exhibit No. 50 which is the 
exhibit evidencing debt owed to Isabell Coats. And all 
evidence offered by this witness would be clearly in 
contradiction to Defendant's Exhibit No. 50. (Tr. 
1376). 
In a later dialogue between the Court and Plaintiff's 
counsel, the following occurred: 
THE COURT: No. No. The Court's ready to rule. The Court 
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is going to allow her to testify. 
MR, PETERSON: Your Honor, I want to except to the 
Court's rulings specifically for the purpose of the 
record. I want to identify to the Court—I need to 
identify for the record my exception. Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 50 shows a liability of $270,000. 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 5 0 — 
THE COURT: Counsel, counsel, didn't you argue that on 
your opening? 
MR. PETERSON: No, I didn't. 
THE COURT: You said that the witness had already 
testified under Exhibit No. 50 as to the amount which is 
due and owing. 
MR. PETERSON: Correct. This witness is testifying to 
something that isn't in evidence before the Court. She 
doesn't have—just because she's a CPA doesn't give her 
authority to testify as to amounts owing on a debt that 
doesn't exist. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I've overruled you, and the Court 
will make a determination as to whether that testimony 
is relevant or wheter it is admissible. Let's go. 
Counsel. (Tr. 1376-77). 
It is apparent that no objection was made that the testimony 
related by Ms. Rasmussen lacked foundation or was unreliable. 
Instead, Plaintff's counsel relied solely upon the theory that 
Isabell Coats' testimony together with Exhibit 50 was the best 
evidence of the debt and therefore could not be contradicted by 
lesser evidence. Since this assumption of counsel was incorrect, 
and since the Court of Appeals specifically found that neither 
Isabell Coats nor Exhibit 50 conclusively established the amount 
of the debt, the objection that was made is without legal basis. 
It is fundamental that in order to preserve a contention of 
error on appeal a party claiming error in the admission of 
evidence must raise the objection to the trial court in clear 
and concise terms and in a timely fashion calculated to obtain a 
-16-
ruling. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Som
 u 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 
1984). This Court stated the purpose of this rule as follows: 
By making use of the rule, counsel gives the trial 
court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using 
the tainted evidence, and thus avoid possible reversal 
and a new trial. Furthermore, the rule is practically 
one of necessity if litigation is ever to be brought to 
an end. State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 
(Utah 1982) . 
A review of the transcript of Ms. Rasmussen's testimony shows 
without question that no specific or timely objections were ever 
made concerning any claimed lack of foundation or unreliability of 
such testimony. Rather, Ms. Rasmussen testified based upon 
undisputed documents of business records of both Mr. Coats and his 
mother and gave her opinion of the resulting debt without any 
further objection than that which has been originally cited 
supra. Thus, because Plaintiff did not properly and timely 
object to Ms. Rasmussen's testimony as to either foundation or to 
reliability, those objections were waived. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals was judicially precluded 
from affirming the judgment based upon an alleged lack of 
foundation or alleged unreliability of the testimony of Ms. 
Rasmussen. There is nothing in the findings of the lower court to 
indicate that the Court concluded Ms. Rasmussen's testimony lacked 
foundation or was unreliable on its own face. Rather, the 
findings indicate that the Court considered her testimony in light 
of the direct testimony of the creditor, he found that Isabell 
Coats was the most convincing. 
Even if it is assumed arguendo that proper objections had 
been made to Melody Rasmussen's testimony on the basis of lack of 
-17-
foundation or reliability, there was no attempt made by Plaintiff 
to preserve that issue on appeal. Although Plaintiff cross 
appealed some ten separate issues, no effort was made to 
alternatively argue that the testimony of Melody Rasmussen and the 
exhibit she introduced was inadmissible for reasons other than a 
contradiction of Isabell Coats1 testimony. 
It is basic appellate law that when a party fails to brief an 
issue that point is waived as to any appellate relief. Pixon v. 
State Farm Auto Ins., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). In 
Northwest Otolaryngology Associates v. Mobilease, 786 S.W.2d 399 
(Tex. App. 1990) a party objected to the use of an expert 
witness that had not previously been designated in the discovery. 
However, that party failed to appeal the overruling of the 
objection. The court held that even though the objection had been 
made timely, and even though the objection was proper and the 
court erred, the issue could not be considered on appeal since it 
had not been raised by the party. See also, City of Sante Fe v. 
Comis, 845 P.2d 753 (N.M. 1992) (although proper objection had 
been made to hearsay video tape, City abandoned the hearsay issue 
by failing to brief it on appeal). Because this issue was never 
raised by Plaintiff it was never argued by the parties either in 
writing or orally. 
In summary, a reading of Finding No. 14(k) (2) clearly 
indicates that the lower court's decision in awarding the $270,000 
debt instead of the $411,000 debt was based solely upon the 
Court's erroneous conclusion that Mrs. Coats has stated a definite 
amount of $270,000. The Court specifically said, "the Court 
-18-
cannot reconcile in its mind the difference between the amount 
testified to by the Certified Public Accountant and the amount 
testified to by Defendant's mother, who is the creditor on the 
note." 
The Court of Appeals, however, rather than recognizing this 
fundamental flaw in the Findings took it upon itself to conclude 
that the testimony of Ms, Rasmussen lacked foundation and was 
unreliable and that the lower court had rejected it for these 
reasons. This explanation is neither contained in the opinion of 
the lower court nor is it justified since there were no objections 
raised in the lower court nor were the issues preserved on appeal. 
The Court of Appeals, therefore, formulated its own conclusion in 
order to salvage the judgment based upon the erroneous finding by 
the lower court. 
This Court should exercise its supervisory power to prevent 
this fundamental departure of appellate review and proper 
appellate judicial proceedings. This Court should accept 
certiorari to review the propriety of the remedy formulated by the 
Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1995. 
Craig ^J Cook 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Craig M. Peterson, Attorney for 
Respondent, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 this 
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2nd day of February, 1995, 
J2 
-20-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
DEC 2 2 ! !B 
Marilyn};, \ ich 
Cierkofiha jrt 








(Not For Publication^ 
Case No, 92Q588-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 22, 1994) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee 
Craig M. Peterson and Joanna B. Sagers, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Kathryn Tuck Coats and Peter M. Coats both appeal from ths 
trial court's decree of divorce. The issues raised on appeal 
mainly concern the trial court's orders regarding the parties' 
financial relationships. We reverse and remand in part and 
affirm in part. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because trial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, 
the court's findings will be overturned only when a clear abuse 
of discretion has been demonstrated. Bincrham v, Binahaji, 872 
P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994). Appellate courts will not 
overturn the trial court's factual findings in a divorce case 
unless clearly erroneous. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 
(Utah App. 1993). In reviewing the trial court's factual' 
findings, due regard will be given to the trial court's 
(W 
opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. Peterson v. 
Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Utah App. 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
The trial court determined that a Kidder-Peabody account in 
Mr. Coats's name, the corpus of which consisted of blue chip 
stock inherited from Mr. Coats's grandparents, was not part of 
the marital estate, but belonged to Mr. Coats alone. Ms. Coats 
argued vigorously at trial that the account should have been 
characterized as marital property, but does not now appeal that 
finding. However, the trial court further determined that 
receivables arising from loans made to third parties from the 
Kidder-Peabody account were marital property and subject to 
distribution. The trial court valued these receivables, referred 
to as bridge loans, at $116,192. Mr. Coats argues that the trial 
court erred in finding the receivables to be marital property. 
We agree. A mere change of a spouse's separate property does not 
in and of itself make the property part of the marital estate; 
rather the issue is whether the change in form signals a loss of 
identity of the funds as a separate account. Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990). It is undisputed that the 
bridge loans were made using funds from the Kidder-Peabody 
account and that the loans were payable to Mr. Coats, with a 
notation that they were for the Kidder-Peabody account. Ms. 
Coats argues that the notes should be considered marital property 
because they were executed prior to trial on this issue, albeit 
after a divorce had been granted in bifurcated proceedings. We 
do not dispute that ordinarily, property should be valued as of 
the time of trial. However, the fact that the parties were 
divorced and no longer living together, supports the conclusion 
that the property had not been commingled with marital property 
so as to lose its character as separate property. Given the 
trial court's uncontested finding that the Kidder-Peabody account 
was separate rather than marital property, it follows that the 
bridge loans made from that account, absent any evidence of 
commingling, is also separate property of Mr. Coats. The record 
lacks any evidence of commingling or other support for the trial 
court's finding that these notes representing the bridge loans 
were marital property. That finding must therefore be reversed. 
Mr. Coats also asserts that the trial court wrongly 
determined that a debt owed to his mother had a balance of 
$270,000 in principal, rather than approximately $400,000, as 
claimed by him. The evidence on this issue is problematic. Mr. 
Coats's mother testified about a note payable to her and her 
husband, signed by Mr. Coats, for a principal sum of up to 
$400,000. She further testified that advances on the note were 
arranged by either a letter or a telephone call followed by a 
920588-CA 2 
letter, to her brother, who worked at Kidder-Peabody. The 
advances were facilitated by loans against Mrs. coats's own 
account at Kidder-Feabody. The letters which Mrs, Coats actually 
verified during her testimony referred to various advances 
totalling $270,000. She did not, however, testify that these 
letters either did or did not represent all advances under the 
note to Mr. Coats, Subsequently, Mr. Coats called a CPA, Melody 
Rasmussen, who testified over Ms. Coats'$ objection, to amounts 
Mr. Coats owed his mother. Ms, Rasmussen referred to Defendant's 
Exhibit 72, which included her handwritten computations of the 
debt and copies of letters purportedly signed by Mrs. Coats and 
copies of checks, purportedly for interest payments on the note* 
Ms. Rasmussen's testimony, however, was based on what she was 
told by another accountant and the content of the letters. She 
could not verify that advances had actually been made, nor their 
amounts• As a result of the nature of this evidence, the trial 
court had to sort out the testimony of Mr. Coats and Mrs. Coats, 
which verified that the loan did exist, and that of Ms. 
Rasmussen, which lacked an adequate foundation for the actual 
figures. Contrary to the assertions of Ms. coats, it appears 
that the trial court accorded considerable credibility to Mrs. 
Coats, by finding that the debt existed and also including in the 
balance due all of the testimony presented by Mrs* Coats, which 
was limited to $270,000. The trial court discounted the 
testimony of Ms. Rasmussen because it was based solely on second 
hand information—she could not establish its reliability. The 
trial court has considerable discretion in assessing conflicting 
evidence and may give weight to the testimony as it deems 
appropriate. Weston v. Weston. 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah App. 
1989)• In this instance, we find no abuse of discretion by the 
trial court in determining that the principal balance on this 
debt was $270,000. 
Mr. Coats also appeals the trial court's decision adding 
$57,000 to the value of the Brandon Canyon property* He 
complains that the trial court admitted that it was an arbitrary 
valuation and that this court should therefore reverse. We have 
examined the evidence presented to the trial court and believe 
that it supports various approaches to the allocation of the 
$57,000 in sales proceeds. We will not remand to allow a party a 
second chance to do a better job of mustering its evidence. The 
$57,000 amount is within the range possible under the evidence. 
We therefore affirm on this issue. 
Mr. Coats also claims the trial court did not properly 
account for the $4,300 credit he was entitled to for the family 
boat, which Ms. Coats sold. We find the record to be unclear on 
this point and therefore direct that the trial court clarify it 
on remand. 
o:>rt^R2-CA 3 
Ms. Coats asserts on appeal that the trial court erred by 
awarding her alimony to terminate in ten years, arguing that it 
should have awarded permanent alimony. We agree. The findings 
of fact justify temporary alimony because of Ms. Coats's 
relatively young age and her potential ability to earn an income. 
However, it is an abuse of discretion to terminate alimony where, 
because of a lack of job skills and experience, the recipient 
spouse is not likely to be able to support her or himself at the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Olson v. Olson, 
704 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985). In order to award terminable 
alimony a trial court must articulate a basis for so doing that 
is not based merely on speculation about future income. Fullmer 
v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah App. 1933) ; Andersen v. 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478-79 (Utah App. 1988); Petersen v. 
Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 243 n.5 (Utah App. 1987). Given the 
continuing jurisdiction of the courts in domestic cases, alimony 
can easily be modified when justified by changed circumstances. 
Olson, 704 P.2d at 567; Petersen, 737 P.2d at 243 n.5. 
Considering the length of the marriage and Ms. Coats's employment 
options at the time of trial, the trial court abused its 
discretion by awarding temporary rather than permanent alimony. 
See also Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1992) 
(upholding permanent alimony after seven year marriage). 
Mr. Coats has conceded on the issue of tax exemptions. We 
have determined that the other issues asserted by Ms. Coats on 
appeal are without merit and therefore we do not address them. 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating that 
appellate courts "need not analyze and address in writing each 
and every argument, issue, or claim raised"). 
CONCLUSION 
We determine that the trial court abused its discretion in 
its characterization of the receivables for the bridge loans as 
marital property. The receivables are separate property to be 
awarded to Mr. Coats. The trial court also abused its discretion 
in failing to award permanent alimony to Ms. Coats. The trial 
court acted within its discretion in determining that the balance 
due on the debt owed by Mr. Coats to his mother was $270,000. We 
therefore reverse and remand to the trial court on the issues of 
the bridge loan receivables and alimony. We also direct the 
court to clarify the $4,300 credit to Mr. Coats for the boat sale 
and to make any other financial adjustments, including possible 
changes in the amount of alimony awarded, necessitated by this 
920588-CA 4 
opinion. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App. 1988); 
Smith v. Smith, 738 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah App. 1987). 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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Civil No. 904904876 DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
ooOoo— 
The above matter came before \h** Court > 1992 
and continued thereafte r I:i II! 
Honorable Homer F Wilkinson, presiding for trial. 
Plaintiff was present in person and represented by counsel, Craig 
M. Peterson. Tin' IVIiMn'ant, wan pi t»si "iii! in person 
by counsel, Melvin G. Larew. The Court having heretofore entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does now enter its 
Supplemental Deci t iie 11 ( P > u i»i <'<» .i . If)1! ows i 
1 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Plaintiff is awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of . children • : f the parties. 
2. The Defendant is awarded rights of visitation with 
J-hip i i nni children which shall lie .is Isillnws: 
a. Every other Saturday 01: Sunday, whichever is 
preferable. However, unless there is a different election by the 
parties, the < p iii. 
without supervision. 
b. One day during the alternate week from 3 2:00 
noon until in ^ m I n the evening on Wednesday evening or an 
alternate evening if the parties elect. 
c. Wh :i 1 e the ::::h i Idren i: eiia i n i n U ta h ciii :i r i rig the 
summer, the Defendant will have every other red letter holiday from 
10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. commencing with July 4 ] 9 92 
d. Wliii:"in l 11 ,-'" c h i l d r e n i. el, iiux n t o V irgi n I a , the 
Defendant may travel to Virginia and visit with the children 
anytime he is in the area during the daytime until 7:00 p.m. in the 
evening. If the chile. to the Salt Lake area while they are 
residing in Virginia, then the Defendant shall have the additional 
right to visit with the children during the daytime while they are 
in Salt Lake City, and he will have to request that visitation. 
2 
e. There will not be any overnight visitation nor 
will the children be required to come from Virginia to Utah to 
visit for six months. During that time, each of the parties are 
expected to receive counseling. Following the counseling, and 
aftei Defendant will have the ri gh !:: to visit with 
the children depending upon his income ability by bringing the 
children to Utah for one-half of the Christmas holiday, two weeks 
i ri the si urine .g 1 993 a nd expai ided summer visits 
weeks beginning in 1994. In addition, if there is an additional 
vacation for the children from school such as Spring vacation or 
Easter vacation, then the Defendant may bring the children to Utah 
for visitation during one-half of that vacation time. Finally, the 
Defendant \ ; :ii ] ] fc = • • i 3 1 ov < = • I t :: • • xerci se Tl lanksgi vi rig >: J i t h t::l i e 
children in Utah during every other year. 
3. The Plaintiff shall replace Mr. Tom Harrison with 
another counselor for the children. Both parties sh . nnmence 
counseling to assist them with their problems identified in 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Findings of Fact entered herein., Such 
counseling .shall commence within thirty (30) days of June 1" I'l'i,.!. 
4. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the 
sum of $1 891 GO per month as child support to be pajm bu uhau n 
will be received by the Plaintiff one-half on or before the 5th day 
of each month and one-half on or before the twentieth day of each 
3 
month. Said child support shall be paid until such time as the 
minor children reach the age of majority ^ graduate from high 
liciie veil bllid,! I, ucuui I jLei SUM enl sliai I hi.1 made 
through the clerk of the Court. 
5. The Defendant shall maintain a policy of health and 
accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the 
parties. All uninsured medical expenses shall be paid on a ratio 
of ei ght percent (8%) hy the Pi a i lit i f f a nd n il nety b; «.i ::> percen !:: ( 92%) 
by the Defendant, provided, however, that the Plaintiff shall pay 
all routine and ordinary medical expenses consisting of office 
visits ., :i:a I: :il JTI s ai id other • Drdi rial: y medicaJ expenses . 
6. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaitniff alimony in 
the amount of $2,000.00 per month to be paid so that it shall be 
recieved by the Plaintiff not later than one-half on the fifth and 
one-half on the twentieth days of each month, such payments to be 
made through the clerk of the Court. Payments shaM hi. ""v;» I1"3 f o r 
ten years from the date of commencement of payment of child support 
and alimony pursuant to this Order, which date of commencement 
s h a l l In mi I I., I » / . 
7. The Defendant may make a single lump sum payment of 
alimony in the amount of $120,000.00 as full and complete 
satisfaction < c:i owing to the Plaintiff by the 
4 
Defendant. If the Defendant elects to make a lump sum payment of 
alimony, that payment shall be made on or before Agusut 16, 1992. 
8. "' shall continue maintain li fe 
insurance naming the minor children and the Plaintifl as 
beneficiaries thereunder. Life insurance shall continue in full 
force and effect in the amounts which have been maintained during 
the parties 7 marriage. At such time as the Defendant no longer has 
obligat i on t : p. ;; 3 ] i m< : nj ti • a mount • :i)f J I fe i nsiii: ance may 1 • 
decreased so that the only continuing obligation for life insurance 
will support obligation -h-*- time, the minor 
chile . leficiai -• uder tx po] I c} u i t: I:i the 
Plaintiff to receive beneficial interest in behalf of the minor 
children. 
9, The marital estae shall be awarded to the parties 
pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" which is attached hereto and 
made a pa rt hereof. Further, all l-nhLltLet sh-i ' ' * "•* |u",,l J ir\"'i ,I|M|1 
to Exhibit "P-911 "' equalize the distribution of the marital 
estate, Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $144,070.00, which shall be 
reduced to judgment. Specifically, t -iff is 
right, title and interest in and to :....« marital residence at 3 6 
Northridge Way, Sandy, Utah, said property being more particularly 
describe 
5 
All of Lot #406, PEPPERWOOD PHASE IV SUBDIVISION, 
as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. 
All int er e s t 111 l 111 IJe I * i r111 1111 i • ' i 111 | J11r c e I M I i e a 1 
property is quieted and shall be of further force and effect. 
10. There have been trust accounts established for the 
benefit of the children. The Plaintiff has been ordered to 
reimburse the children's accounts for funds that have been borrowed 
from ("hose arrnnnt' "In parties run' mil * iniw .HI furthei funds 
from the accounts of the children, except by agreement and 
signature of both parents f or agreement -h- children - the 
funds 2 
age of majority. 
11. The Defendant was ordered to pay temporary support 
in this matter. Pursuant to the laws and cases I n the state of 
Utah and specifically under Utah Code Annotated, §78-32-10 f the 
Defendant is in cont 2mpt c f the Orde* ; 
is fined $200.00 and is to be imprisoned in the Salt Lake County 
Jail for thirty (30) days for his contempt. 
The seii ten; ::IE t ::) j a i l iiiinil 1 tup < MI KM1 h n u l i l h e s t a y e d u p o n 
the Defendant paying the amounts he has previously been ordered to 
pay by the Temporary Order. The Defendant must pay $13,810.97 on 
or bef i ddi I.. una 1 ,i I ' , II II 'i mi m IIKI'OIH 
July 26, 1992, for a total payment of $27 f621.94. 
6 
T h e D e f e n d a n t bliall lecei'M" "redid.. d y a u i s L L lie iijiiiiuint 
owed for any charges made on his credit cards fay the Plaintiff 
which have not been charged back to the Plaintiff. In addition, he 
shall receive a credit in the amount of $500.00 for a snow blower 
which was sold the Plaintiff. There will be further 
deductions frf L t: f n be, paiii by HIP Defendant for the past 
due support. :f the Defendant fails to make payment as ordered on 
or before July 26, 1991 ;hen he shall report to the Salt Lake 
County Ja i ] fc i :: i :i -.- - til: ,ei: ei n for th Ixt;y ( 30 ) days. 
12. The Plaintiff should write a check from the account 
of Peter, Jr. to the Defendant for the amount of dividends 
deposited to his account. 
13. The Plaintiff is awarded additional judgment against 
the Defendant in J 
attorney's fees. The Plaintiff's request :or expert's fees for 
the professionals who have testified in this matter and assisted 
the Plaintiff in piepaid L • un I IIHI I I.LM" n . d e n i e d 
14. The Defendant shall indemnify and hold the Plaintiff 
harmless from any tax liability which may be incurred by the 
parties o:r assessed against them for the fil ing of t ax returns for 
all prior years, unless additional tax assessment has been caused 
by misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the Plaintiff. 
7 
The Defendant P awarded one of the minor rlnldren « ' a 
depenc ling his state and federal income 
tax returns and Plaintiff will be awarded *\:« of the children 
for that purpose. If t he Plaintiff JLS nc o 
clii ^n 52H0 1 e obligated notify the 
Defendant and allow him utilize one or ho*: r t . v ^ deductions 
for the purpose of filing his statf 
15. The Defendant's request for additional visitation be 
denied. 
16. A permanent in 1 a .1 r 11.1 111 • 1 11 
l-cirtieb i" 11 |. lining them, from talking about each other i.n front of 
the children, degrading each other, or taking any action which 
would be denigratin h shal1 be 
:iijoined from discussing the proceedings in this case with (or in 
front of) the children or providing them with access to any 
information or any of the pleadings this case. Any action by 
either of the parties in violation of this injunction shall be 
construed a contempt of Court and punished accordingly. 
I"1 I'1
 r« i nf i f 1 1 ,-tWfiiilpi1 d I >tal judgment against the 
Defendant in the amount of $164,070.00. 
DATED this *~f day of August, 1992. 
BY^Hjl? COURT: 
strict Court Judge ? 
JUDGMEN1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed and 
r cne for SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE <",. DIVORCE AND 
ttZK day 
in 
Melvir. _. Larew, __ . , 2sq^7 
4190 Highland Drive tioti/ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
- ooO oo - - - - - - - - - -
KATHRYN TUCK COATS, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
v« : 
PETER M. COATS, : 
Defendant. : civil No. 9Q49Q4876 DA 
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
00O00 
The above matter came before the Court June «- 992 
and continuing thereafter on J 1 mi n e 1 Il , II 2 Il 5 e 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, Judge presiding The 
Plaintiff was present in person and represented by counsel, Craig 
M. Peter rh< Di 3 fe « i 
by counsel, Melvin G Larew. The Court having heretofore entered 
a Decree of Divorce dissolving the marriage entered into between 
t E 
trial, the Court having considered the testimony itnesses 
presented and the documents admitted into evidence, having reviewed 
the pleadings and file herein, and now being familiar in the 
premises
 f does enter its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. While the Defendant has asked the Court to award 
joint custody in this matter, there has been no pleading filed by 
the Defendant seeking joint custody, and the differences between 
the parties in this case is such that the parties could not 
facilitate or cooperate in an award of joint custody. It will be 
in the best interests of the children if the Plaintiff is awarded 
custody subject to reasonable rights of visitation being reserved 
in the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff has requested that the Defendant 
exercise visitation only in a supervised capacity. However, the 
Court is persuaded that both parties have problems which each of 
them have created for themselves as parents and which have affected 
the emotional lives of the children. While the Court has not 
interviewed the children, it has read the reports of the 
therapists, and it is clear that the children do have fear toward 
their father, much of which has been generated by their mother. 
The Court finds that there are two adults before the Court who love 
their children, but have committed acts against each other which 
have seriously affected their children. There is concern about the 
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father's dysfunction and the mother informing the children of his 
dysfunction. 
3. The parties have submitted themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the Court. It is the determination of the Court 
that action must be taken to attempt to reinstate a normal 
relationship between the children and both of their parents, a 
relationship which has suffered destruction for which both of the 
parents are responsible. In that regard, the Court finds that both 
of the parents, the Plaintiff and the Defendant, need some 
professional counseling regarding raising the children. The 
Plaintiff needs very strong counseling to assist her in letting the 
children be children and letting them be friends with their father 
so that they can love and respect him and seek his fatherly advice. 
The father needs counseling to re-build his image as a result of 
comments made by the Plaintiff, much of which was probably true; 
some made as a result of the Defendant not paying child support 
while he was taking vacations and enjoying life, as well as having 
encounters or affairs. It will be necessary for the Defendant to 
engage in counseling to attempt to rehabilitate himself in his 
relationship with the children. 
4. While there has been testimony before the Court that 
the Defendant suffers from a sexual addiction, there has been 
nothing to persuade the Court that he has abused the children, 
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either physically or sexually, nor is there anything which 
indicates to the Court that the Defendant is going to abuse the 
children in that way. In addition, there is no evidence to 
convince the Court that the Defendant is a pedophile or would 
engage in any criminal activity toward the children. 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant should be allowed 
to visit with the children during the summer of 1992 for 
unsupervised daytime visits. A specific schedule will be necessary 
to accomplish reasonable visitation. The Court will outline a 
schedule, and if counsel and the parties can work out something 
which is more satisfactory, the Court will have no objection to 
such a schedule. However, a reasonable visitation schedule will be 
as follows: 
a. Every other Saturday or Sunday, whichever is 
preferable. However, unless there is a different election by the 
parties, the day will be Sunday from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. 
without supervision. 
b. One day during the alternate week from 12:00 
noon until 7:00 p.m. in the evening on Wednesday evening or an 
alternate evening if the parties elect. 
c. While the children remain in Utah during the 
summer, the Defendant will have every other red letter holiday from 
10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. commencing with July 4, 1992. 
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d. When the children return to Virginia, the 
Defendant may travel to Virginia and visit with the children 
anytime he is in the area during the daytime until 7:00 p.m. in the 
evening. If the children come to the Salt Lake area while they are 
residing in Virginia, then the Defendant shall have the additional 
right to visit with the children during the daytime while they are 
in Salt Lake City, and he will have to request that visitation. 
e. There will not be any overnight visitation nor 
will the children be required to come from Virginia to Utah to 
visit for six months. During that time, each of the parties are 
expected to receive counseling. Following the counseling, and 
after January 1, the Defendant will have the right to visit with 
the children depending upon his income ability by bringing the 
children to Utah for one-half of the Christmas holiday, two weeks 
in the summertime during 1993 and expanded summer visits to four 
weeks beginning in 1994. In addition, if there is an additional 
vacation for the children from school such as Spring vacation or 
Easter vacation, then the Defendant may bring the children to Utah 
for visitation during one-half of that vacation time. Finally, the 
Defendant will be allowed to exercise Thanksgiving with the 
children in Utah during every other year. 
6. The paternal grandmother has requested a visitation 
schedule from the Court. While the paternal grandmother is 
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entitled to visitation, this Court cannot enter an Order effecting 
the rights of the paternal grandmother when she is not a party to 
the action before the Court. Before such an Order can be entered, 
the paternal grandmother will have to petition this Court to seek 
an Order for specific visitation rights. 
7. The children have been receiving therapeutic 
counseling by Mr. Thomas Harrison. The Court finds that there is 
a great deal of antagonism between Mr. Harrison and the Defendant. 
The Court recognizes that the Defendant is a person who wants his 
own way, even demands his own way, and when he doesn't get it, he 
tries to force it through other actions. However, while the 
Defendant's antagonism is not productive and should not be 
recognized by the Court to allow the Defendant to get what he 
wants, the Court does recognize that the relationship between Mr. 
Harrison as the counselor and the Defendant as the children's 
father, may no longer be productive to resolving problems between 
the Defendant and the children. Since antagonism appears to exist 
between the counselor and the Defendant, the Court finds that it 
will be in the best interest of the parties and the children to 
place the children with another therapist. 
8. The Court finds that all of the counseling which is 
necessary to assist the parties and the children should be 
commenced within thirty (30) days of June 16, 1992. 
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9. In reviewing the evidence presented by the parties 
regarding their incomes, the Court has heard no testimony as to 
income of the Plaintiff, except that she has stipulated that she 
can earn at least $1,000.00 per month. The Court accepts the 
Stipulation of the Plaintiff and finds that $1,000.00 earned income 
should be imputed or attributed to the Plaintiff for each month. 
Regarding the income of the Defendant, the Court is not persuaded 
by the testimony presented and by the exhibits admitted, when 
taking into consideration the lifestyle of these parties, that they 
could live in the style and manner they have from an income of 
$22,000.00 per year or $16,000.00 per year as represented by the 
Defendant. The Court finds that the parties could not live in that 
lifestyle even on an income of $58,000.00 per year. Based upon the 
evidence presented by all of the accountants and expert witnesses, 
the Court is persuaded that the best evidence relating to the 
Defendant's income is shown by Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-96," except 
for the year 1991. The Court finds that for the purpose of 
determining the Defendant's income, the best evidence is to use 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-96," but to use the evidence presented by 
the Defendant for the year 1991 to show his total income as 
reported to the Internal Revenue Service. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-96" should be amended to state 
the amounts on what the parties have referred to as "above the 
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line" which are taken directly from the Defendant's tax returns and 
the Defendant's exhibit which show an adjusted gross income of 
$22,222.00 for the year 1991 with no taxes paid. After this 
adjustment has been made, the appropriate calculations and 
adjustments will be made "below the line" on Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"P-96" and Defendant's income for the purposes of determining child 
support will be the average "estimated gross spendable income," 
which the Court believes will come out at approximately $120,000.00 
per year. The Court finds that will be the best evidence as to the 
income of the Defendant. The Court finds that the testimony 
presented by Defendant's Exhibit "D-61" simply is not credible when 
it presents to the Court an average income of approximately 
$35,000.00 per year. The parties simply could not live the 
lifestyle they have in the past on that type of income. 
10. Based on the foregoing, attached hereto as Appendix 
A and made a part hereof by reference is the revised and amended 
copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-96" with the adjustments ordered to 
be made to that Exhibit. The Court finds from Attachment A hereto 
that the Defendant's annual income is $137,596.00 per year 
resulting in a gross monthly income of $11,466.00 per month. For 
the purpose of determining child support, the total income of the 
parties is $12,466.00 per year. Attached hereto as Attachment "B" 
and made a part hereof by reference is the Uniform Child Support 
8 
Worksheet for this case. Based thereonf the Court finds that the 
appropriate amount of child support to be paid by the Defendant to 
the Plaintiff is $1,891.00 per month. Such payments are to be made 
timely by the Defendant so they will be received by the Plaintiff 
one-half on the fifth and one-half on the twentieth days of each 
without any delay in the payments, said payments commencing from 
the date of ruling in this matter, June 16, 1992. Child support 
shall be paid until such times as the minor children reach the age 
of majority or graduate from high school, whichever shall occur 
later. 
11. During the term of the marriage, the Defendant has 
maintained health and accident insurance for the benefit of the 
minor children, and the Court finds that it reasonable for him to 
continue to do so for so long as he is obligated to pay child 
support for their benefit. Any medical expenses incurred for the 
minor children which are not paid for by the policy of health and 
accident insurance will be paid on a ratio proportionate to the 
parties' income, the Plaintiff paying eight percent (8%) and the 
Defendant paying ninety-two percent (92%) of such uninsured medical 
expenses, provided, however, that the Plaintiff will pay uninsured 
routine medical and dental expenses, including routine office 
visits, physical examinations and immunizations. For purposes of 
definition, all medical care, including dental, orthodontia, 
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counseling, and all other related health care, shall be construed 
to be medical treatment for the children. 
12. Based upon the evidence presented and the length of 
the marriage, the Court finds that an award of alimony in this case 
is appropriate to allow the Plaintiff to continue to live in a 
lifestyle to which she has reasonably become accustomed during the 
marriage. In addition, the Defendant has the ability to pay 
alimony to the Plaintiff and, in light of the parties' lifestyle, 
the earned income, and all other relative evidence received by the 
Court relating to the issue of alimony, this Court does find that 
an award of alimony is appropriate, but in light of the parties7 
ages, and the potential ability of the Plaintiff to earn income, 
the award of alimony should not be without a time limitation. The 
Court finds that based upon the duration of the marriage, ten 
years, is an appropriate time for the Defendant to pay alimony and 
$2,000.00 per month is an appropriate amount to be paid. In 
addition, based upon the Defendant's historic failure to pay 
alimony as required by the terms of the Temporary Order, and based 
upon the Plaintiff's willingness to accept a lump sum payment, the 
Court finds that the award of alimony may be satisfied by the 
Defendant paying a lump sum payment of $120,000.00 as full and 
complete satisfaction of alimony, but that election must be made 
within the next sixty (60) days and paid on or before August 16, 
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1992. All payments of alimony are to be made by the Defendant to 
the Plaintiff so that they are received by the Plaintiff one-half 
on or before the 5th and one-half on or before the 20th days of 
each month. 
13. The Court finds that with the support obligations 
which have been ordered to be paid by the Defendant, it is 
reasonable that such obligations be guaranteed in the event of the 
Defendant's death. During the marriage, the parties have 
maintained insurance on the Defendant's life, and it is reasonable 
that such insurance shall continue in full force and effect until 
the Defendant is no longer obligated to pay child support or 
alimony in this case. The life insurance policy shall be in. the 
same amounts as has been carried during the marriage. When the 
requirement to pay alimony ceases, then the Defendant may terminate 
life insurance for the benefit of the Plaintiff, and decrease it so 
that he is providing life insurance for the minor children as 
beneficiaries, except that the policy shall designate that the 
Plaintiff is to receive the funds on behalf of the children for so 
long as the Defendant is obligated to pay child support. 
14. For the purpose of determining the marital estate, 
the Court adopts Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" for valuation and 
distribution with certain revisions which will be stated herein. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" is to be revised and attached to these 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit "C" to reflect 
the Court's Order and the distribution of the marital estate. In 
determining the values of the assets and the outstanding 
liabilities, the Court finds as follows: 
a. The value of the real property at 36 
Northridge, Sandy, Utah is $273,000.00, and that property will be 
awarded to the Plaintiff. 
b. The Court finds that the best evidence for the 
value of the home at 11807 South Woodridge, Sandy, Utah, was the 
appraisal presented by the Plaintiff's expert, Mr. Bodell, and that 
value is $106,500.00. The Court finds that the parties' interest 
in the Woodridge property is fifty percent (50%) of the $106,500.00 
or $53,250.00. 
c. The Court is persuaded that the duplex at 3708 
South 3325 West is actually owned in its entirety by the parties, 
and that the Defendant's brother has no interest in said property 
other than the fact that his name may be on the title. Defendant's 
brother has made no payments on the duplex and has made no tax 
claims either. That property is awarded to the Defendant at a 
value of $46,000.00. 
d. While the Court is suspect of the appraisals on 
the furniture and furnishings which have come before the Court, it 
is clear that the only reliable evidence regarding the furnishings 
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now located in Virginia have come from an appraiser. Accordingly, 
even though the Court is convinced that the personal property 
cannot be replaced for $7,000.00, the only expert valuation which 
the Court has is the appraisal submitted by the Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the furnishings in Virginia are 
valued at $7,375.00 and that those furniture and furnishings will 
be awarded to the Plaintiff. 
e. There is no contest regarding the Woodridge 
furnishings. The value has been stated by both parties at 
$3,500.00 and those furnishings should be awarded to the Defendant 
at that value. 
f. Regarding the Northridge furnishings, the Court 
is not persuaded that the Defendant understood the intent of his 
own testimony regarding his stated value of the personal property 
while he was testifying. The Court is convinced that the Defendant 
was stating the value that the property had to him and that it 
probably cost that much. While the Defendant testified that the 
value of the property was $18,000.00, and there is no other 
evidence before the Court relating to the value of that personal 
property, the Court finds that the property actually has a lesser 
value than testified to by the Defendant, and that it should be 
arbitrarily reduced to approximately twenty-five percent (25%) of 
its stated value. The Court finds the value of the Northridge 
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furnishings to be $4,5CO. 00, and that property will be awarded to 
the Defendant. 
g. The values stated on Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" 
regarding the Porsche automobile, the GMC van and the Jeep, are all 
adopted by the Court as being the best evidence of the value of 
those automobiles, and the automobiles will be awarded to each of 
the parties as stated on Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91." 
h. The Court has received a great amount of 
testimony regarding the boat and its value, but the Court was 
persuaded from the outset, and is even more convinced after hearing 
all of the testimony, that the Plaintiff had possession of the 
boat, she did not have sufficient funds to pay her expenses and to 
raise her children because the Defendant was not paying child 
support or alimony as ordered, and she sold the boat to meet the 
family needs. The best evidence before the Court is that the 
Plaintiff received $4,300.00 from the sale of the boat. While the 
Court is of the opinion that the boat was worth more than 
$4,300.00, and in fact, the Plaintiff received more than $4,300.00, 
but after payment for repairs and other costs, the net benefit to 
the Plaintiff was $4,300.00. It was as a result of actions on the 
part of the Defendant, by his failure to pay support as ordered, 
that the Plaintiff received only $4,300.00 for the sale of the 
boat. The Court finds $4,300.00 to be the best value to be 
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attributed to the boat, and the boat should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff. However, in light of amounts, which are discussed 
later, the amount attributed to the value of the boat to the 
Plaintiff will be taken off of the division of assets. 
i. The Court finds the balance of the assets to be 
as stated on Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91," including all investments 
and cash, except as follows: 
(1) The investment diamonds should be added as 
an asset and awarded to the Plaintiff at a value of $3,000.00. 
(2) The Brandon Canyon cash amount stated as 
a negative dollar value of $6,266.00 should be eliminated. In 
addition, the note on Lot 23 for Brandon Canyon, Lots 4, 15, 16 and 
17, Brandon Canyon, should all be eliminated. The Court is not 
thoroughly convinced that the Court has received all of the 
information relating to Brandon Canyon as an asset. However, the 
Court is reasonably persuaded that the values stated by the 
Defendant of $319,117.00 is a reasonable value to be attributed to 
Brandon Canyon, except for the fact that the Defendant has received 
or will receive additional money for the sale of lots, for example, 
he has already sold Lot 16 for $171,900.00. The Court finds that 
as Brandon Canyon is developed and the lots are finished, the 
Defendant will sell more homes and will receive additional profit. 
The Court finds that the evidence is so conflicted that it will be 
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necessary to adopt some arbitrary number to determine the .value. 
Accordingly, the Court is convinced that the value of Brandon 
Canyon is at least some portion of Lot 16 which has been sold, and 
the value stated by the Defendant of $319,117. While it is 
arbitrary, the Court finds that the only reasonable method for 
placing a value on Brandon Canyon is to take one-third of the value 
of the sale of Lot 16, which was $171,900.00 and add that to the 
values stated by the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court finds that 
the value of Brandon Canyon is $319,117.00, plus $57,300.00 for a 
total value of $376,417.00 and Brandon Canyon will be awarded to 
the Defendant at that value. 
(3) The notes receivable on Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "P-91" will be adjusted and a discount will be allowed. 
The Defendant asserted a discount rate of forty-one percent (41%) 
while the Plaintiff presented a discount rate of ten percent (10%). 
The Court finds that the discount rate of the Defendant is too high 
and the discount rate of the Plaintiff is too low. There is no 
evidence which convinces the Court that any specific number is more 
appropriate than another. However, based upon the evidence 
presented, the Court does find that a twenty percent (20%) discount 
rate is a reasonable rate to be applied to the note and Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "P-91" should be recomputed stating the notes at a value 
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showing twenty percent (20%) discount and then the notes should be 
awarded to the Defendant at those amounts. 
(4) The Court received no testimony regarding 
the asset identified as target capital. That asset should be 
eliminated. 
j. With the foregoing adjustments to values, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91" should be used to calculate all of the 
assets awarded to each of the parties and the assets should then be 
awarded as stated on that Exhibit. 
k. The Court adopts all of the liabilities as 
stated in Exhibit "P-91" and makes specific findings as follows: 
(1) The notes payable to Key Bank, First 
Security Bank for River Meadows, the mortgage on Woodridge, the 
mortgage on Northridgef the duplex and the funds borrowed from Sara 
Coats and Grace Coats
 f are accurate at the values stated f and shall 
be paid by each of the parties as designated on Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"P-91." 
(2) The Court finds the liability owed to 
Isabell Coats to be $270,000.00. There was conflicting evidence 
presented to the Court as to the amount of liability owed to 
Isabell Coats. Isabell Coats testified to the Court and stated 
that Defendant's Exhibit "D-50" showed all of the obligation owed 
by the Defendant to her. The total amount of the notes which make 
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up Defendant's Exhibit "D-50" is $270,000.00. While the 
Defendant's certified public accountant testified on the amount of 
the notes and stated that the outstanding balance was $411,025.00, 
that amount was never verified by Isabell Coats, and the Court 
cannot reconcile in its mind the difference between the amount 
testified to by the certified public accountant and the amount 
testified to by Defendant's mother, who is the creditor on the 
note. The Court finds that the most credible evidence is that of 
the creditor and if she were owed more than $270,000.00, that 
testimony certainly would have been presented to the Court. That 
is especially true in the mind of the Court when the Defendant 
placed Isabell Coats on the stand out of time to be able to get her 
testimony in regarding the liability and the amount owed to her by 
the Defendant. Accordingly, the Court specifically finds that the 
preponderance of the evidence is that the outstanding note owed to 
Isabell Coats is in the amount of $270,000.00. 
(3) In reviewing the liability owed by the 
Plaintiff as presented by Exhibit "P-78," the Court is not going to 
allow the amounts of those liabilities which is owed to Plaintiff's 
father. Those amounts are to subtracted from the liabilities owed 
by the Plaintiff and Plaintiff Exhibit "P-91M is to reflect that 
change in liability. 
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(4) The Plaintiff has testified that she has 
borrowed $5,000.00 from one of the children's trust accounts which 
is not reflected on Exhibit "P-91." That Exhibit, again, should be 
modified to reflect that liability as being owed by the Plaintiff. 
After the foregoing changes have been made to 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-91", the Court finds that in order to 
equalize the marital estate, and pursuant to Attachment "C" 
attached to these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it will 
be necessary for the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff $144,070.00 to 
equalize the distribution of the marital estate. The Plaintiff 
should be awarded judgment against the Defendant for that amount. 
15. There have been trust accounts established for the 
benefit of the children. The Plaintiff has been ordered to 
reimburse the children's accounts for funds that have been borrowed 
from those accounts. The parties are not to draw any further funds 
from the accounts of the children, except by agreement and 
signature of both parents, or the children if the funds have not 
been disbursed by the time the children reach the age of majority. 
16. The Defendant was ordered to pay temporary child 
support and alimony in this matter. The Court finds that the 
Defendant did have knowledge of the existence of the Order and the 
amounts he was ordered to pay. Further, the Defendant did have 
sufficient assets, sufficient means and sufficient income to pay 
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the obligations he was ordered to pay. The Defendant willfully and 
intentionally, and without just cause, failed to obey the Orders of 
the Court and failed to pay the outstanding obligations he was 
directed to pay. Pursuant to the laws and cases in the state of 
Utah and specifically under Utah Code Annotated. §78-32-10, the 
Defendant is in contempt of the Order of the Court. The Court 
finds that it is reasonable for the Defendant to be fined an amount 
of $200.00 and to be imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail for 
thirty (30) days for his contempt. 
However, the Court finds it is reasonable that the 
sentence to jail and the fine should be stayed upon the Defendant 
paying the amounts he has previously been ordered to pay by the 
Temporary Order. The Defendant must pay $13,810.97 on or before 
June 26, 1992, and an additional $13,810.97 on or before July 26, 
1992, for a total payment of $27,621.94. 
17. The Court finds that the foregoing is the amount 
which the Defendant is delinquent pursuant to the Temporary Order 
entered in this matter. The finding of the delinquency is made by 
using the total amount which the Plaintiff claims the Defendant 
should have paid, $79,901.41. However, the Plaintiff stated to the 
Court that there may be some amounts which should be removed. 
While neither party saw fit to go through the Plaintiff's Exhibit 
and specifically eliminate amounts which should not have been paid 
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pursuant to the Order, each agreed that some amounts might be 
eliminated. The Court has simply adopted ten percent reduction as 
a reasonable amount to eliminate from the expenses submitted by the 
Plaintiff. After reducing $79,901.41 by ten percent and then 
giving the Defendant credit for payment of $44f289.33 which the 
Plaintiff agrees the Defendant has paid toward temporary support 
pursuant to the terms of the existing Temporary Order, that leaves 
a balance of $27,621.94 as previously stated by the Court. 
18. The Defendant should receive credit against the 
amount owed for any charges made on his credit cards by the 
Plaintiff, which have not been charged back to the Plaintiff. In 
addition, he should receive a credit in the amount of $500.00 for 
a snow blower which was sold by the Plaintiff. There should be no 
further deductions from the amount to be paid by the Defendant for 
the past due support. If the Defendant fails to make payment as 
ordered on or before July 26, 1992, then he should report to the 
Salt Lake County Jail for incarceration therein for thirty (30) 
days. 
19. During these proceedings, the Plaintiff received 
checks in the amount of approximately $400.00 which were dividend 
checks. She deposited those checks to the account of Peter Coats, 
Jr., believing that the money belonged to Peter, Jr. The Plaintiff 
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should write a check from the account of Peter Coats, Jr. to the 
Defendant for the amount of those dividends. 
20. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has incurred 
substantial attorney's fees in this matter, well in excess of 
$40,000.00. The Plaintiff is in need of assistance to pay her 
attorney's fees and the Defendant has a substantially greater 
ability to assist in the payment of those fees than does the 
Plaintiff. The Court finds that the time and costs incurred were 
reasonable for the work performed on behalf of the Plaintiff and 
the rate charged for both attorney's fees and legal assistant 
services were also reasonable when considered within the community 
standards. The Court finds that a reasonable amount for the 
Defendant to contribute to the Plaintiff for her attorney's fees is 
$20,000.00 and the Plaintiff should be awarded additional judgment 
against the Defendant in the amount of $20,000.00 as payment toward 
her attorney's fees. The Court specifically finds that under the 
case of Peterson v. Peterson, the Court is not persuaded that case 
holds that professional experts, such as accountants, doctors, 
engineers and others, are the kind of expert that the Appellate 
Court contemplated would receive consideration for payment of 
expert fees. The Court finds that the case of Peterson v. Peterson 
addresses the payment of expert fees only for professionals as it 
relates to custody issues and evaluators. The Court finds that the 
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Plaintiff's request for expert's fees for the professional who have 
testified in this matter and assisted the Plaintiff in preparation 
of her case, should be denied. 
21. The Defendant should be ordered to specifically 
indemnify the Plaintiff from any tax liability which may be 
incurred by the parties for the filing of tax returns for all prior 
years, unless additional tax assessment has been caused by 
misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the Defendant should be ordered to indemnify and hold 
the Plaintiff harmless from all tax liabilities for all past years 
which may be assessed against the parties. 
In considering tax ramifications, the Court finds that in 
this case, it is reasonable that the Defendant be awarded one of 
the minor children as a dependent for the purpose of filing his 
state and federal income tax returns and the Plaintiff will be 
awarded two of the children for that purpose. Further, it is 
reasonable that if the Plaintiff is not able to utilize two 
children as a deduction, then she should be obligated to notify the 
Defendant and allow him to utilize one or both of those deductions 
for the purpose of filing his state and federal income tax returns. 
22. The Court finds that the Defendant's request that 
the children exercise extended visitation with him this summer for 
the purpose of attending a family reunion is not reasonable in 
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light of the need for a specific visitation schedule which has 
already been addressed by the Court• Specifically, the Court finds 
that the Defendant's request for such visitation be denied. 
23. In this case, it will be necessary that a permanent 
injunction be entered against both parties to enjoin them from 
talking about each other in front of the children, degrading each 
other, or taking any action which would be denigrating to the 
position of one parent. Each party shall be enjoined from 
discussing the proceedings in this case with the children or 
providing them with access to any information or any of the 
pleadings in this case. Any action by either of the parties in 
violation of this injunction should be construed a contempt of 
Court and punished accordingly. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court 
does now enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
1. A Decree of Divorce has heretofore been entered in 
this matter and a Supplemental Decree of Divorce should now be 
entered to reflect the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
2. A Decree of Divorce should incorporate all of the 
terms of the Findings of Fact and should reference to the Findings 
of Fact for purposes of interpretation, including attachments 
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hereto, which should be made a part hereof and referenced for any 
future interpretation of the intent of the Court. 
3. This Court does conclude that the Defendant is in 
contempt of prior Orders of this Court and that he should be fined 
and sentenced to jail for his contempt. However, the Court does 
find that the sentence should be stayed if the Defendant complies 
with the Order of the Court. In the event the Defendant fails to 
comply with the Order of the Court, a bench warrant should be 
issued for his arrest and incarceration in the Salt Lake County 
Jail forthwith. 
4. Judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff 
and against the Defendant pursuant to the Findings of Fact 
heretofore entered in this matter and the attachments hereto. 
Judgment should accrue interest at the lawful rate allowed for 
judgments. 
5. All pleadings entered herein should become final 
upon entry. 
DATED this f day of £ZZ^-*-*- 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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